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ESTATE OJ' THURSTON 
(88 C.Id 107. U3 P.Id IJl 
[L. A. No. 21236. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1950.) 
007 
Estate of JOHNSON THURSTON, Deceased. THOMAS B 
'KUCHEL, as State Controller, etc., Appellant. v. 
GEORGE W. TRAMMELL, as Executor, etc., e1. aI., 
Respondents. 
[1] Ta.xation-Inheritance Taxatton-Tuable 'l'ransfen-Trana-
fera Inter ViV08.-A transfer "Of real property to the trans-
feror's children by which be reserves a life estate in himself is 
tuable under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13644. 
[2] Id. - Inh~itance Tuation - Taxable Transfers - Transfers 
Inter Viv08.-Even tboujrb II tax attacbes to a transfer when 
the transferor reserves 8 life estate ID the property, it can be 
avoided by the subtlequent relinquishment of the life estate 
before the death of the trtlll .. feror, it such relinquishment if. 
not made in contemplation of death 
(3) Id. -Inheritance Tuation - Tax!Lble 'l'ransfers - 'l'ransfers 
Inter Vivos.-The express purpose of the provisions for the 
taxation of specified "ltet" t"11011 transfers is to reach every 
transfer made in lieu of or to avoid passing of property by 
will or the laws of succession, and only such transfers are 
subject to taxation. 
[4] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Taxable 'l'ransfers ~ Transfers 
Inter Vivos.-The tax on transfers "lI,r "'110' is not imposed on 
transferS not in conteulplation of death to transferees whose 
interest in and possession or enjoyment of the property are not 
afiected by whether the transferor lives or dies, and it is imma-
terial whether such a transfer is accomplished by a single trans-
action or by an initial transfer and the subsequent relinquish-
ment, not in contemplation of deatb, of the only interests 
retained in the first transfer whose retention nntil the death 
of the transferor would have resulted in the estate 0'1' in-
heritance taxation of the transfer. . 
[5] Id. - Inheritance Tuation - Taxable 'l'ransfers - 'l'ransfers 
InterVivoS.-Although·an.mter "'1108 transfer is subject to an 
inheritance tax, its taxability is determined by the restrictions 
on the enjoyment and possession of the property at the death 
of the transferor and Dot by the restrictions at the time of the 
transfer. 
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Taxable Transfers - 'l'ransfers 
Inter Vivoa.-If. notwithstanding a transfer was taxable at tae 
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 451; 28 Am.Jur. SI. 
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time it was made, the only retained interest Dpon which tu. 
ation may be pred.icated is extinguished before the death of 
the transferor, the in'er ,,",0. transfer is not aubjeet to the 
inheritance taL 
[7] ld.-Inheritance 'laxation-'lanble Transfers-Transfen iD 
Oontemplation of Dea.th.-A life estate relinquished in contem-
plation of death is in the same category as if the transfer had 
not been made and the tax is imposed as if it had been retained 
untiJ the transferor's death. 
[8] ld. -Inheritance 'laxation - Taxable Transfers - 'lraDsfen , 
Inter Vivos.-A tax measured by the vaJue of the entire corpus i 
transferred caDDot be avoided by the payment of acoma81'&-1 
tiOD equal to the value of the interest relinquished. 
[9] ld. - Inheritance 'laxation - Taxable Tra.uafers - Tra.uafen 
Inter Vivos.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 18644, retention of 
a life estate is treated as equivalent to ownership of the entire 
corpus. . i 
[10] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Taxable 'lraDsfers - 'lraD8fen i 
Inter Vivos.-Where an owner of real property conveys two 
parcels thereof to his children, reserving a life eB~te ill eaell, 
and later relinquishes the life estate in one parcel but not ba 
contemplation of death, the relinquishment of aueh lite estate 
is effective to preclude an inheritance tax of the transfer with1 respect to that parceL 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Lot 
Angeles County fixing inheritance tax. Fred MilIer, Judge.-
Affirmed. .1 •. 1 
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton 
L. Barker, Deputy Inheritance Tax Attorney, Walter H. I 





George W. TrammeD,1n pro. per., for Responden1& 
West, Vizzard, Howden & Baker as Amicus Curiae on behalf .. ~ 
of Respondents. J 
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 3,1941, decedent conveyed two 
parcels of real property to his children, respondents herein, 
and reserved to himself a life estate in each. The transfer 
was made without consideration, and a gift tax was paid 
thereon, measured by the market value of the remainder inter-
ests transferred. On DecE'mber 29, 1942. decedent relinquished 
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which they paid him $10,000. The controller concedeS that 
the consideration is adequate for the transfer of the life estate 
and does not contend that the original transfer of the remain-
der interests or the subsequent relinquishment of decedent's 
life estate in one of the parcels was made in contemplation of 
death. Decedent retained his life estate in the other parcel 
until his death on May 19, 1946. 
The controller contends that an inheritance tax is due upon 
the transfer of both parcels by the deed of October 3, 1941, 
measured by their market value at the date of decedent's 
death less the consideration paid for the relinquishment of 
tht> life estate in one parcel, subject to a credit for the gift 
tax paid upon the original transfer. Respondents concede 
that the tax is properly imposed upon the transfer of the 
parcel in which decedent retained a life estate until his death. 
They object, however, to t.he report of the inheritance tax 
appraiser including as taxable the transfer of the parcel in 
which decedent relinquished his life estate. The trial court 
sustained respondents' objections and entered an order fixIng 
the inheritance tax due. The controller appeals from that 
order. 
Section 13644 of the Rt'!venue and Taxation Code provides 
that "A tr~sfer' conIormhig to Section 13641 -iuia -·1inaer·'-'--
which the transferor expressly or impliedly reserves for his 
life an income or interest in the property transferred is a 
transfer subject to this part." No provision is made for the 
avoidance of the tax by the subsequent relinquishment of the 
reserved life estate. The controller therefore contends that the 
taxable event is the transfer with the reservation ·of a life 
PStat.e, that the tax attaches at that time, and that its imposi-
tion is not affected by the subsequent relinquishment of the life 
t'state upon which the tax is predicated. Respondents contend, 
however, that the tax is imposed only upon the beneficial suc-
cession t.o property at death and that, unless a transfer .of 
ownership is effected at the death.of the decedent, the tax can-
not be sustained. 
The inheritance tax is primarily a tax upon the succession 
to property at death. The statute expressly includes as sub-
jects of inheritance taxation transfers of property by will. 
succession, or survivorship, and transfers of the proceeds of 
life insurance. An inheritance tax limited to the taxation of 
transfers from thE' dead to the living, however, could be 
easily avoided. "1'he common and perhaps not unnatural 
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aversion of property owners to the burdens of taxation appears 
to -have applied with special force to the dimirlution of the 
estates left by them at death through the imposition of estate. 
inheritance, or succession taxes. The early statutes taxing 
property passing by will or inheritance were followed by resort'. 
to various means for avoiding subjection to the tax. Among 
the devices most simple and commonly resorted to were gifts 
in contemplation of death. and transfers, in trust or other· 
wise. whpreby the transferor reserved to himself the life use 
or in('ome for life. These artifices were met by 'provisions in 
the taxing statutes calculated t.o closE' such avenues of tai' 
avoidance." (Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn.: 
207, 211-212 [158 A. 245) ; Matter of Keeney, 194 N.Y. 281, I 
287 [87 N.E. 428] ; Belvering v. BulLard. 303 U.S. 297,302 l58\ 
S.Ct. 565. 82 L.Ed. 852] ; .t1 illike?! v Pnited Stafes, 283 U.S. 
15,20 [51 S.Ct. 324,75 L.Ed. R091 ; "-;.~t(1fe nt Potter. 188 Cal. 
55, 63 [204 P. 826).) RE'venlll' and THxation Code. sections, 
13641-13648, accordingly provide for thf' taxation of §PecifiE'd ' 
snter vivos transfers by which the ownpr of property rE'tains 
such an interest therein or imposes such restrictions upon the 
nse thereof that for tax purposes be is rellardf'd ftR the owner 
of the property at his death and his tranRff'r tlirrE'of as a 
_testamentary ,disposition .•• The statute taxes not ml"l'e1Y'TI1ose 
interests which are deemed to pass at death according to j 
refined technicalities of the Jaw of propprty.1t alRo -taXf'S-i 
i~ter ~i?os transfers that. are too much akin t~ testamelltary 1 
disposltlons not to be subJected to the same eXCIse." (H elver- i 
sng v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 [60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.E,1. 604, ! 
125 A.L.R. 1368 J ; Estate of Potter, supra, 63; Charnbl rli v. 
Lamb, 186 Cal. 261, 266 [199 P. 33] ; Klein v. United States, ! 
283 U.S. 231, 234 [51 S.Ct. 398, 75 L.Ed. 9961; Goldstone v. , 
United States, 325 U.S. 687, 692 [65 S.Ct. 1323, R9 L.Ed .. 
1871, 159 A.L.R. 1320]; Oommissioner v. C"rd"ZfI'l1 El1iafe. 
173 F.2d 19, 27; Oommissioner v. Hager's g.~tafe, 173 F.2J I' 
613, 616; In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 63-64 1242 
N.W. 459); Oochran v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 182 127 \ 
A.2d 120) ; Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust 00., 114 Conn. 207, \ 
219 [158 A. 245] ; see 1 Paul, Estate and Gift Taxation. § 2.13, . 
p. 140; Eisenstein, Another Glance at the H "l1l)ck Problem, ' 
1 Tax L.Rev. 430. 438-439; ct., Helvering v. Olij)'ord, 309 U.S. 
331.334 160 S.Ct. 554.84 L.Ed. 7881; Du Pont v. Oommis-
'sioner, 289 U.S. 685, 689 [53 S.Ct. 766. 77 L.Ed. 14471.) 'fhe 
tax is impost'd on the infer vivos transfer but its collection is 
post pOlled until the death of the transferor, and it is measured 
) 
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by the market value of tht' transferred property at the date 
of his death. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13402; Chambers v. Lamb, 
186 Cal. 261, 266 (199 P. 331; E8tateof Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 
5!l [204 ·P. 826) ; Chambers v. Gibb, 186 Cal. 196, 198 [198 P. 
1032] ; Estate of M1Lrphy, 182 Cal. 740. 744, 747 1190P 461; 
Central Hanover Bank &- Trust Co. v Kelly, 319 U.S. 94. fl7.M 
163 S.Ct. 945, 87 L . .Ed. 12821 ; see. also. Pidelif,I·Philadelph IfJ 
Tru.~f Co. v. Rothen.<;1ei<. H24 U.S. 108. 110 l6fi Ret. 508. ~!I 
L.Rd. 783, 159 A.L.R. 2271; Plick'lI Eiliofe v CnmrlH.~stOn'·f. 
HiG F.2d 733. 739; 58 Yale L.Jour. 313. 311' \ [1] TIlt' 
trlllliifE'r of Octob('r ~. 1941. by which decedpn' re~f'rved 8 lil'p 
I'statl' in the propprty wa.c; thprefore taxA bit' under RPcUon 
13644. 
[2] Eyen thou~h a tax attaches to a transfer whpn 'he 
transferor has reSl'rved a life p~tate in the property. howevt'l. 
it (~an be avoided by the Ruhst'quent relinqlliRhment of thE' 
lift' E'state bpfore the death of the transferor. if Rnch rplm· 
qlliRhment is not made in contE'mplation of dpath. [8) Tlw 
('xpress purposE' of thl;' provifuonR for thE' ta~f1tion of .. pel·Ilil'd 
tnter 1Jit'Q.~ transfl'r~ is to reach "p"ery trandl'r milo!' In liP" 
of or to avoid the pa~sing of property by will or tht' lawl- (If 
Sl1N!!'ssion." (Rev & TIIX Corle. & 13648. E.tat,. (It Pfltlf'r. , . 
SI/T}ro. 63). and only ;Inch transfpn; are suh.wI·t to<taxatHm. 
(4) Thl' taxis not imposed on transfprs nut in ('ontempllltlOn 
of df'ath to transferees whose intl'rl'Rt m and posst'R."ion or 
I'lJjoyment of the property are not atfectl'it by whether the 
tran~feror lives or dies. It is immaterial wtH'ther such 8 trans-
fer is accomplished by a single transaction or. aR in the present 
caSE', by an initial transfer and the subseqnent relinquishment, 
not in contemplation of death. of the only interests retained 
in thl' first transfer whosp retl'ntion until the death of the 
trflnsfpror would have resulted in the p.~tate or inheritance 
taxation of the transfer. (AUen v. Trll.lIf Co. of Georgia. 326 
U.S 630.636,637 166 Ret. 389.90 L.Efl 3671.) 
[5] Although the mtrr Vt1l011 transfer is thl' !'Il1hject of the 
tax (Helvering v IJaflock. supra. 112). itR taxability is deter-
mined by the restri(,tion~ on thf' t'njoyment anit possession of 
the property at the death of the transferor, and Dot by the 
restrictions at the time of t.he transfer. [6] If, notwitb-
standing that the transfer was taxable at the time it was 
made, the only retained interest upon which taxation may be 
predicated is extinguished'bpfore the death of the transferor, 
the inter trivos transfer is not Bubject to the inheritance tax. 
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(See Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect in 
Possession at Grantor', Death, 26 Iowa L.Rev. 514,526.) "The 
disappearance of a decedent's reversionary interest, togetber ! 
with the resulting estate tax liability, prior to death through : 
events beyond decedent's control is a possibility in many situa· 
tions such as the one in issue. . . . But the imposition and 
computation of the ~tate tax are based upon the interests in 
actual existence at the time of decedent's death." (Goldstone 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 693 [65 S.Ot. 1323, 89 L.Ed:· 
1871, 159 A.L.R. 1320] ; Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia; supra, 
637. Fidel·ity.Philadelpkta Trust Co. v. Bothensies, 324 U.S. 
108, III [65 S.Ot. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227] ; Estate 
of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453, 457, 462·463 [159 P.2d 630].) This 
reasoning has been invoked by several state courts to permit 
the avoidance of inheritance taxation by the inter vivos relin· 
quishment of a reserved life estate under statutes, providing 
for the inheritance taxation of a transfer in which such life 
estate was reserved. (Lamb's Estate v. Morrow, 140" Iowa 
89 [117 N.W. 1118, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 2261; Brown v. Gulliford, 
181 Iowa 897 [165 N.W. 182] ; People v. Welch's Estate. 235 
Mich. 555 [209 N.W. 930] ; see Rottschaefer, 81lpra; cf., Harf- ! 
ford v. Martin, 122 N.J.L. 283. 288 [4 A.2d 31, 121 A.L.R ... ] 
354].) i 
After the decision of the United States Supreme Court in I 
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 169 8.Ct. 322;1 
93 L.Ed. 288], which overruled May v. Hemer, 281 U.S. 238 
[50 8.et. 286, ;4 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244], and held that· 
transfers made before March 3. 1931, in which the transferor 
r(>served a life elltAfe in the transferred property, were taxable 
IInoer the provisions of Internal Revenue Code, section 
811 ( c)·. it was generally assumed that the relinquishment 
of such life estates would preclude the inclusion of the trust 
corpus in the grm;."1 estate of the transferor, unless the relin-
quishment were accomplished in contemplation of death. (See 
Bittker, Th./! Chtlrch and Spiegel Cases, 58 Yale L.Jour. 825, 
857 -858; Pavenstedt, Congress Deactivates Another Bombshell, 
5 Tax L.Rt>v. 309. 336: Schuyler, Escape from Spiegel, 44 JIl. 
L.Rev. 131. 142·14!l. 148: Looker, Estate Taxation of Living 
*iflternal Rev8flutI Code. 811: .. The value of the gr088 estate of the 
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of hill 
death of all property . . . 
.. (e) To the extent of any interest therein of whieh the decedent 
baa at any. time made a transfer ..• 
II (C) intended to take effect in posseallion or enjoyment at or after 
hill death." 
) 
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Truds.49 Columb.L.Rev. 437, 441. 452-453; ::17 CRI.L.Rev. 134.t 
141-142.) The same assumption has apparently been made 
by Congress itself. Recognizing that many per~ons who had 
retained life estates created before March 3, 1931 in reliance 
on May v. Hemer would relinquish them to avoid the inclu-
(lioll of the transferred property in their gross estates, Con-
gress provided (P. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.) that 'Such 
life estates might be relinquished during 1949 and 1950 with-
out liability for gift tax thereon and without incurring the 
rj~k that such relinquishment, insofar as it was made to avoid 
estate taxes, might be deemed made in contemplation of 
death. Under the rule of the Allen and Goldstone cases that 
"the imposition and computation of the estate tax are based 
upon the interests in actual existence at the time of.decedent's 
dl'ath," the relinquishment of such life estates would clearly 
preclude taxation of the original transfer in which such lifp 
estates were retained, just as would the relinquishment Ilf 
decedent's life estate in the present case. 
Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453 [159 P.2d 630], on which 
the controller relies, does Dot support his position. [n that 
case, he did not seek to tax the parts of the original transfpr 
to the trustee that bad" been obtained by the benefici"arigs 
with the trustee"s consent before the donor's death. ··Only 
the balance remaining in the trusts at the time of the fathE-r's 
death" was taxed. (26 Ca1.2d 453. 462.) Thus, the controller 
in effect conceded that those parts that became complE.'ted gifts 
bC'fore the transferor's dE.'ath were not taxable. It was empha-
sized that the trustor had made the gift in trust "110 that. for 
the rest of his lifetimE.', the principal would be kept intact 
and the income would be paid to thE.' family of which he wa.'> the 
head .... The respondents' interests were contingent upon 
their surviving the trustor. Each trust contained spendthrift 
provisions 80 that the beneficiaries could n~ither dispose of 
their interest in the corpus (citing eases) nor request that 
the trusts be terminated before the trustor's death. (Citation.) 
Moreover, irrespective of spendthrift provisions, the trusts 
could not be so terminated, since other persons, some perhaps 
not yet born, had possible interests in the trust property. 
(Citing cases.)" (Estate of Madison, R1tpt"a, 464, 465.) 
In contrast to the Madison case, the gifts here wer~ fV)t 
in trust and the trustor placed no shacklt's on thE.' property 
that could not be and were not removed before his dE.'ath. Hil'! 
children were the absolute owners of the realty for more than 
-
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three years before his deatb and could do with it what they 
wished. 
The controller contends, however, that a construction of 
section 13644 contrary to his own would permit a transferor 
to make an essentially testamentary disposition of his prop-
erty and thereby evade the inheritance tax. He contends that . 
a transfer reserving a life estate may be made under circum- I 
stances precluding the assertion that it was made in contem- : 
plation of death, and the transferor may retain his life estate-! 
until he feels that death is imminent. It is feared that he 
could then, in contemplation of death. relinquish his life 
estate to the remaindermen, paying inheritance taxes, if any, 
on the transfer of the life estate only. ,Thus, the value of the 
parcel transferred to respondents is $134,000, and the value 
of the relinquished life estate $10.000. If decedent retained 
the life estate until his death, the tax would be measured by 
the full value of the property. By relinquishing his life estate 
in contemplation of death, the decedent could at!complisb a 
testamentary disposition subject to inheritance taxation of only 
a fraction of the value of the transferred property. 
The controller's apprehension is unfounded. Certain inter 
vivos transfers of property by which the transferor retains 
sufficient control over or interest in the transferred property 
are treated as testamentary dispositions. (E.g., Commissioner 
v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (69 S.Ct. 322, 93 L.Ed. 
288J; Estate of Spiegel, 335 U.S. 701 [69 S.Ct. 301, 93 
L.Ed. 330J; Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453 [159 P.2d 
630J.) If the control or interest is retained until the 
transferor's death, the tax is imposed as if the transferor 
had remained the owner of the property until his death, 
and disposition of the property had been through his estate. 
The testamentary effect of the earlier transfer cannot be 
altered by a later testamentary transfer, either by will 
or in contemplation of death. (Ct., Allen v. Trust Co. of 
Georgia, 326 U.S. 630, 637 [66 S.Ct. 389, 90 L.Ed. 367].) There 
is no reason to favor the transferor who relinquishes his inter-
est in contemplation of death over the taxpayer who retains 
the shackles on the property until his death. '" For the pur-
poses of the [estate or inheritance] tax, property transferred 
by the decedent in contemplation of death is in the same 
category as it would have been if the transfer had not been 
made and the transferred property had continued to be owned 
by the decedent up to the time of his death." (Igleheart v. 
CO'fn.missioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711; In re Kroger'8 Estate, 145 
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F.2d 901, 908; Estate of Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650, 660; Edate 
of Hornor, 44 B.T.A; 1136.) [7] The life estate relinquished 
in contemplation of death is therefore "in the same category 
as it would have been if the transfer had not been made," and 
the tax is imposed as if it had been retained until the trans-
feror'8 death. [8] A tax measured by the value of the 
entire corpus transferred cannot be avoided by the payment 
of a consideration equal to the value of the . interest relin-
quished. [9] Under section 13644, retention of the life 
estate is treated as equivalent to the ownership of the entire 
corpus; its relinquishment in contemplation of death is there-
fore equivalent to a testamentary disposition of the entire 
corpus. The requirement of adequate consideration is designed 
"to prevent a man from diminishing his taxable estate by 
creating obligations not meant correspondingly to increase it, 
but intended as gifts or a means of distributing it after his 
death. " (Oommissioner v. Porter, 92 F .2d 426, 428.) It 
follows that a transfer in contemplation of death that reduces 
the transferor's taxable estate is not supported by adequate 
consideration within the meaning of the tax statutes. (Phillips 
v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662, 665; Latty v. Oommissioner, 62 F.2d 
952,954; see 37 Cal.L.Rev. 134, 141-142.) 
[10] IIi the present case, there is no question of attempted 
tax evasion. It is not contended that the relinquishment of 
the retained interest was in contemplation of death. The trans-
fer and relinquishment are equivalent to an outright transfer 
in which the grantor, before his death and not in contempla-
tion of death, has alienated all interest in or control over the 
property. The relinquishment of the life estate was there-
fore effective to preclude inheritance taxation of the transfer 
of October 3, 1941, with respect to the parcel as to which it 
was relinquished. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J. t Schauer, J .. 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Novem-
ber 20, 1950. 
of. • .... ~.-:-. 
